Menu Search Account

LegiStorm

Get LegiStorm App Visit Product Demo Website
» Get LegiStorm App
» Get LegiStorm Pro Free Demo

Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress (CRS Report for Congress)

Premium   Purchase PDF for $24.95 (98 pages)
add to cart or subscribe for unlimited access
Release Date Revised Jan. 18, 2017
Report Number R43926
Report Type Report
Authors Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Source Agency Congressional Research Service
Older Revisions
  • Premium   Revised Nov. 8, 2016 (98 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised Aug. 1, 2016 (94 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised June 30, 2016 (93 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised June 20, 2016 (89 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised June 10, 2016 (88 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised May 25, 2016 (85 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised April 28, 2016 (82 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised March 15, 2016 (78 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised Jan. 11, 2016 (79 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised Nov. 25, 2015 (73 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised July 17, 2015 (67 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised June 25, 2015 (65 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised June 12, 2015 (62 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised May 20, 2015 (59 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Revised April 17, 2015 (53 pages, $24.95) add
  • Premium   Feb. 27, 2015 (50 pages, $24.95) add
Summary:

Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In 2013, Raúl began his second and final five-year term, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Castro has implemented a number of market-oriented economic policy changes over the past several years. A planned April 16-18, 2016, Cuban Communist Party congress will likely focus on progress in implementing economic goals or guidelines that were adopted at the last party congress in 2011 as well as future economic measures. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government has released most long-term political prisoners, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years, reflecting a change of tactics in repressing dissent. U.S. Policy Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policy over the years has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, while a second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights and democracy projects. In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included talks to restore diplomatic relations (relations were reestablished on July 20, 2015); a review of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (Cuba's designation was rescinded on May 29, 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In order to implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations four times (January and September 2015 and January and March 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can only be lifted with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba, but he emphasized that the United States could do more through engagement than isolation. With the goal of advancing the normalization process, President Obama is scheduled to visit Cuba on March 20-22, 2016, the first visit of a U.S. President to Cuba in almost 90 years. Legislative Activity The Obama Administration's shift in Cuba policy has spurred strong interest in Congress. Some Members lauded the initiative as in the best interest of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while others criticized the President for not obtaining more concessions from Cuba to advance human rights and protect U.S. interests. In the 114th Congress, several hearings have been held, and numerous legislative initiatives have been introduced. Numerous bills would lift or ease sanctions: H.R. 274, H.R. 403, and H.R. 735 (overall embargo and other economic restrictions); H.R. 634, H.R. 664, and S. 299 (travel restrictions); H.R. 635 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); S. 491 and S. 1543/H.R. 3238 (certain embargo restrictions); S. 1049 (financing of agricultural sales); S. 1389/H.R. 3055 (telecommunications); H.R. 3306 (energy resources and technologies); and H.R. 3687 (agricultural exports and investment). Other bills would increase restrictions on engagement with Cuba: S. 1388 and H.R. 2466 would require a plan for resolving U.S. property claims before the President could ease restrictions on travel and trade; S. 1489 and H.R. 2937 would prohibit financial transactions with the Cuban military and interior ministries, associated entities, and senior members. Regarding action on FY2016 appropriations measures, the Senate version of the FY2016 Financial Services appropriations bill, S. 1910, had three Cuba provisions that would have eased sanctions on Cuba related to agricultural exports, travel, and shipping. In contrast, five FY2016 House appropriations bills—H.R. 2577, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development; H.R. 2578, Commerce, Justice, and Science; H.R. 2772, State Department and Foreign Operations; H.R. 2995, Financial and General Government; and H.R. 3128, Homeland Security—had Cuba provisions that would have blocked some of the Administration's Cuba policy changes (related to travel, trade, and increased funding for the U.S. diplomatic mission in Havana) and would have introduced new economic sanctions. Ultimately, none of these provisions easing or tightening sanctions was included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113. The omnibus, however, funds Cuba democracy programs ($20 million) and Cuba broadcasting ($27.14 million), has provisions regarding U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba (similar to provisions in S. 1705/H.R. 4127), and prohibits FY2016 funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay (similar to the FY2016 defense authorization measure, P.L. 114-92). Among other bills, H.R. 570 would cease Radio and TV Martí broadcasting; H.R. 738 would allow Cuban nationals to play professional baseball in the United States; H.Res. 181 would call for the extradition of U.S. fugitives from justice; H.R. 1782, among other measures, would express the sense of Congress that U.S.-Cuban relations should not change until the Cuban government ceases human rights violations; S. 1999 would authorize certain oil spill prevention and response measures; H.R. 3818 would repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act; and H.R. 4247/S. 2441 would provide that certain Cubans are ineligible to receive refugee/parolee assistance. Identical bills S. 757/H.R. 1627 would modify a trademark sanction, while H.R. 274, H.R. 403, H.R. 635, and H.R. 735 would repeal the sanction. H.R. 654/S. 2559 and H.R. 4678 would prohibit changes to the lease agreements for the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay without congressional action. For more on the legislation, see Appendix below.