Hong Kong's Reversion to China: Effective Monitoring Critical to Assess U.S. Nonproliferation Risks

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Report Type	Reports and Testimonies
Report Date	May 22, 1997
Report No.	NSIAD-97-149
Subject	Dual-use technologies Export regulation Exporting Foreign governments Foreign trade agreements Foreign trade policies International economic relations Licenses Nuclear proliferation Nuclear weapons Australia China Customs Service Automated Export System Hong Kong Japan United Kingdom

Summary:

The United States has restricted exports of technology with possible military applications to China while allowing shipments of these same items--including titanium alloys, machine tools, and high-performance computers--to Hong Kong. Although the British colony reverts to Chinese control in July 1997, the United States has no plans to change its export policy toward Hong Kong, raising concerns about increased Chinese access to sensitive, dual-use technology. GAO concludes that monitoring Hong Kong's export controls is critical to assessing the risk to U.S. nonproliferation interests. This may not be easy because of the changes that could occur in Hong Kong and the difficulties in gauging Chinese intentions and behavior. However, changes in the composition and volume of U.S. exports of controlled items to Hong Kong could signal attempts by the Chinese to obtain sensitive technology, such as optical sensors, that China had previously been denied.

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Hong Kong's Reversion to China: Effective Monitoring Critical to Assess U.S. Nonproliferation Risks